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The French government’s rejection of the Blair House Agreement in 1993 enabled France to resist 
agricultural reform and achieve relative gains over other European Union States. The existence of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) allows France to extract the economic surplus of European 
Union (EU) members through taxes and subsidies, which artificially improve the competitiveness of 
French agriculture. France took advantage of the EU principle of consensus by adopting a strategy 
of non-compliance to agricultural negotiations, positioning it to directly influence EU Commission 
policy. This allowed France to benefit from EU bargaining power in the Uruguay Round, and ensure 
greater concessions from States driving agricultural reform. The reinstatement of veto power in the 
EU Community has made future agricultural reform more difficult, allowing France to continue to 
realise welfare gains at the expense of other EU members. The paper adopts a literature review to 
analyse French national interest and the costs and benefits of foreign policy strategies. 
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In this paper it will be contended that France chose to reject and pressure for the 
renegotiation of the Blair House Agreement in 1993 because it threatened the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and French interests in protecting its agricultural 
industry. Furthermore it will also be argued that France adopted a strategy of non-
compliance and coalition building within the European Union (EU) to safeguard its 
competitiveness and dominance of both EU and worldwide food markets.  
 
In an effort to progress the Uruguay Round, the European Commission and the US 
concluded the Blair House Agreement in November 1992, which was designed to 
reduce agricultural protectionism.2  However France regarded this agreement as 
threatening its agricultural industry, which is protected and subsidised in order to 
maintain its competitiveness both within the EU and externally.3 As a result, France 
sought to reopen agricultural negotiations and reduce the degree of liberalization 
required by the Accord.4 France adopted dual strategies of maintaining a GATT veto 
as long as possible and engaging in consensus building within the EU to gain support 
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for its position.5 This paper will show that the French delegation was able to take 
advantage of EU institutional rules to achieve its immediate aim of ensuring a review 
of the Accord, and secondly decreasing the degree of liberalization demanded. 
 
During 1993, the French government sought to maintain it had no choice but to reject 
proposed reductions in the CAP because of their effect on domestic producer groups 
and citizens. French policy makers presented the view that the Blair House 
Agreement unnecessarily went further than the MacSharry CAP Reforms,6 and even 
that these two reforms were incompatible.7 Furthermore, the French government 
highlighted that violent protests and results from recent national elections meant that 
they had no manoeuvrability on the issue as the welfare and livelihood of its people 
were at stake.8 As a result other EU States recognised the credibility of a French veto 
under the Luxembourg Compromise, 9  allowing the French to prevent further 
progress on CAP reform and the Uruguay Round.10  
 
Secondly, France sought to influence the European Community through arguing that 
the Blair House Agreement undermined the fundamental principles of the Common 
Agricultural Policy and France’s role as both a domestic and international 
agricultural producer.11 Firstly, it emphasized that provisions on market access would 
reduce France’s competitiveness within the EU and thus derail the notion of 
Community preference.12 In addition, the French government articulated its goal to 
remain as an exporter of agricultural goods and stated that further dismantling of the 
CAP would undermine the ability of French agriculture to compete with world prices. 
As a result, French EU representatives emphasized that this was a direct threat to 
rural development and the CAP principal to maintain a reasonable standard of living 
for farmers.13 Furthermore, France sought to build up consensus support and argued 
that its role as an exporter contributed to outward EU influence.14 In fact, Agriculture 
Minister Louis Mermaz stated that correct CAP reform could improve the EC’s 
leverage on international issues and enable the EU to use the CAP as a bargaining 
tool.15    
 
Finally, French EU representatives maintained that the European Commission had 
no mandate for the negotiating outcome that resulted from the Blair House Accord, 
and sought to reinstate French dominance over negotiations.16 France disagreed that 
the General Affairs Council had the authority to allow the Commission to bargain 
with third countries as they saw fit and to conclude an agreement.17 Furthermore, 
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France argued that the bilateral agreement concluded between the US and the EU 
had no legal value, and that there was no formal agreement.18 As a result, France 
sought to limit the autonomy of Commission negotiators Sutherland and MacSharry, 
so that it could reinforce the importance of unanimity and rally other Community 
partners to its defensive position on agriculture.19  Finally, it called for changes in EC 
internal procedures to ensure national governments had control over the 
Commission, so any state with divergent interests such as itself could not just be 
presented with a reduction of sovereignty through a “fait accompli.”20  
 
In evaluating the Blair House Accord, French policy makers perceived that it would 
hasten Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform and this as being deeply 
threatening and disadvantageous to strategic interests.21 Policy makers considered 
the Agreement in relative gains, a realist conception of foreign policy where States 
seek to maximise power gains relative to others.22 Firstly, it was interpreted that the 
Accord and provisions such as minimum market access were not permissible as they 
would lower the competitiveness of the French agricultural industry domestically.23 
The French understood that this would reduce the ability of farmers to sell their 
goods, and undermine the CAP principal of Community preference, as it would hurt 
France’s share of the internal EU food market.    
 
Secondly, it was perceived that the Accord could not be allowed to detract from 
French agricultural competiveness and its role and influence as a food exporter. In 
fact, France was opposed to limiting the volume of agricultural exports, and instead 
preferred to limit subsidies, as this would enable France to indirectly compensate 
farmers for this loss of income and continue to maintain artificially low prices for its 
produce on world markets.24 The advocates of dependency theory argue that the 
importance of food security and food provision means that this can result in 
disproportionate gains in influence.25 A reduction in exports would impact the degree 
of interlinkage the French economy has with other States, and thus threaten French 
power. Ultimately, France was preoccupied with relative gains in power and 
influence, which occurred through the extraction of the economic surplus from other 
states in the EU. 
 
Similarly, in contrast to its official pronouncements, the French Government had 
deeper strategic reasons for rejecting the Blair House Accord, namely that the 
continuance of the CAP allows it to realize strategic economic gains at the expense of 
other EU members. France is the greatest beneficiary of market distorting tariffs and 
subsidies for agriculture,26 which fund inefficient French production and artificially 
improve French GDP, at the expense of broader EU welfare. Thus, according to the 
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realist view of international relations, France wishes to maintain this position to 
increase its influence and power on the world stage.27 Price supports borne by the 
rest of the EU also ensure that France can sell produce to EU states at vastly more 
expensive prices than if they bought similar goods on world markets.28 As a result, 
Conybeare states that this meant that mutual defection as opposed to cooperation 
was a dominant strategy for France in repealing the Blair House Accord.29   
 
In strategising how to overturn the Blair House Agreement, France was constrained 
by a power deficiency relative to the United States.30 As a result, France had to work 
within the structure of the EU in order to maximise its negotiating power. In delaying 
use of its veto power in the General Affairs Council and seeking to persuade other EU 
states to adopt its position on CAP reductions, France maximised strategic benefits 
from the EU institutional structure, and minimised negative sentiment on its 
position. 
 
Firstly, an alternate strategy adopted by the French government was to bypass the EU 
Community and seek to negotiate directly with the US to increase its impact on final 
Uruguay Round outcome.31 This attempt to engage in bilateral negotiations had the 
advantage of being able to secure a quick resolution. However, the US saw no reason 
to reopen negotiations on the Accord because it was better off with the original 
decision, which was less extreme than what France sought to achieve.32 
 
One plausible alternative for France was to unilaterally reject the original Blair House 
Agreement, declare it legally invalid and use its veto in the General Affairs Council to 
prevent its adoption. This would force the EU to adopt France’s position without even 
needing to engage in consensus building, as the trade policy of the Community is 
decided as a bloc, allowing France to stall the Uruguay Round indefinitely. 33 
Theoretically, developing countries could have given up on their demand for 
agricultural reform, which would have allowed France to maximize its utility from 
other Uruguay Round reforms and also indefinitely delaying agricultural reform. This 
would be a considerable strategic gain; however unilaterally blocking agricultural 
reform would have been most likely to result in a critical break-down of the Uruguay 
Round. Developing countries stood to gain most from agricultural reform,34 and the 
collapse of the Uruguay Round would have set back achievements on TRIPS, TRIMS 
and formation of the WTO, which France has been one of the greatest beneficiaries 
from.35 Also this would have increased the likelihood that the EU would be excluded 
from other regional trade deals and suffer exacerbated trade sanctions from the US.36 
This would allow the US to reap relative gains, resulting in economic and strategic 
losses for France and the EU. 
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In contrast, a more convincing strategy was the push by France to endow the 
European Commission with offensive trade tools as part of its demand for 
renegotiating the Blair House Agreement.37 This was designed so that one single state 
could not block retaliation against offensive US measures under Section 301, and 
improve the degree the French could exercise control over the EU in a trade war.38 
The French also sought a defence instrument that would allow the EC to fast track 
anti-dumping rules.39 However, this policy was self-defeating, as by reaching an 
agreement on the Uruguay Round this enabled the formation of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body that has greatly helped France avoid costly trade wars.40  
 
The final alternative for the French was to offer national co-financing of the CAP, in 
exchange for a greater degree of EU support to reject or review the Blair House 
Accord. In order to counter perceived benefits for other EU members in a reduction 
of the size of the CAP budget, the French could have negotiated to assume a greater 
role in financing the CAP in exchange for EU support in rejecting the Accord. 
However the French government has never offered to even talk about national co-
financing,41 because much like an individual or corporation, France has an interest in 
acting as a rent seeker to maintain and strengthen strategic gains. France benefits 
enormously from the CAP, allowing it to appropriate the economic surplus of other 
EU States through their contributions to higher prices for French produce because of 
both subsidies and price supports.42 Finally, France was determined to defend these 
economic benefits and delay reform. 
 
The French policy of coalition and consensus building in the Community was 
enormously successful in achieving its immediate objective of gaining a review of the 
Blair House Accord. Furthermore, subsequent trade negotiations had moderate 
success in reducing the degree of liberalization demanded under the Accord. 
 
Firstly, France was successful in achieving its demand for a review of the Blair House 
Accord. France persuaded other EU States that the issue was of vital national 
importance, seen in the credible threat of a veto which was taken seriously by States 
such as Belgium and Germany.43 These States were unwilling to allow this situation 
to escalate and to undermine the EU or to isolate France.44 This enabled France to 
gain a qualified majority to defend French interests in the General Affairs Council, 
and gain EU support for a review of the Accord.45 France used the principal of 
consensus within the EU to force the US to cave in to its interests or achieve no 
agreement at all.46 Ultimately, stalling the Uruguay Round reduced US bargaining 
strength at the expense of concessions made to the French Government. 
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Similarly, France had considerable success in its secondary aim of reducing the 
degree of liberalization under the Blair House Accord, which actually meant that 
France was not forced to reduce transfers to farmers.47 In fact, the use of the 1986-88 
base period artificially exaggerated the level of production.48 Paarlberg argues that 
through the selective use of data points, the conversion of non-tariff barriers to 
bound tariffs was actually so high it exceeded the original level of protection before 
the Accord, even after a 36 per cent reduction in protection called for by the 
Agreement.49 Also the final Accord reduced the planned retrenchment of export 
subsidies, so that they did not add any extra impetus to reductions in the MacSharry 
CAP reforms.50 In addition, France was able to secure an agreement that there would 
be no further increases in the set-aside.51As a result, the French government stated 
that it had achieved its demands in preserving the livelihood of farmers and 
recognizing the CAP at the international level.52  
 
As well as this, the French were successful in protecting their dominance in 
agriculture within the EU. The Minimum Access requirement was weakened to 
between 3 to 5 per cent of Community markets, reducing the degree of 
competitiveness and maintaining prices at artificially high levels.53 Furthermore, a 
major amendment to the Accord meant that large cash subsidy programs were not 
included in the GATT calculations for reducing support to farmers, allowing France 
to increase compensatory payments.54 On the other hand, the conversion of non-tariff 
barriers to tariffs has meant that transfers to agricultural producers are now more 
visible, as they are from taxpayers rather than producers of food. 55  This may 
undermine the ability of the French government to reduce pressure from the rest of 
the EU to curb these welfare losses in the future. 
 
In addition, France was able to protect its agricultural competitiveness in export 
markets. The French were able to manoeuvre around Blair House restrictions on the 
production of oilseeds, as the EU supported an increase in the CAP support for the 
production of biofuel.56 Moreover, the French were able to extend the Peace Clause 
from 6 to 9 years, which was designed to prevent further US action against CAP 
subsidies. 57  This enabled the French to delay further agricultural reform and 
safeguard their economic rents from CAP reductions. However, Lawrence states that 
after the Peace Clause expires, the US could use the new WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body to ensure the CAP becomes a major target under the SCM. 58 Ultimately, 
Paarlberg argues that the final agriculture agreement in the Uruguay Round 
contributed nothing towards agricultural reform achieved by MacSharry Reforms, 
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because the US would have defended its agriculture with sanctions anyway.59 This 
demonstrates the extent that the French were able to delay and curtail external 
pressure for reform. 
 
Finally, France achieved strategic institutional benefits through reining in the 
original autonomy of the Commission negotiating the Blair House Agreement. In 
reopening negotiations with the Americans, France reinforced the principle of strict 
intergovernmentalism in the EU, as the Commission required Council approval of 
important decisions.60 Furthermore France reinforced the importance of unanimity 
as the results of the Uruguay Round had to be approved by consensus.61 However, 
this has been at the expense of Commission legitimacy in negotiating trade 
agreements in the future. 62  Ultimately, France has been able to change the 
institutional rules of the game and made it easier for an economically defensive 
member state such as itself to capture the EC negotiating position.63 
 
In conclusion, in this essay it has been argued that France was able to stymie reform 
of the Common Agricultural Policy by using the institutional structure and rules of 
the EU to its advantage in order to block the Blair House Agreement. It was argued 
that this has resulted in a dilution of the ability of the supranational authority to 
engage in trade deals, and bolstered French power in the EU through reinforcing the 
principle of unanimity. Furthermore it has been shown that this will make it easier 
for France to resist both internal and external pressure to reduce agricultural 
protection in the future. In conclusion, the rejection of the Blair House Agreement 
demonstrates the limitations of EU supranational power, and has allowed France to 
safeguard the permanence of strategic and economic benefits it gains as a result of 
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